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Executive Summary
Those closest to the field of public administration, either through scholarly or practitioner
roles, know very well that pay systems within the federal government are in dire need of new
ideas. The General Schedule was established 60 years ago with the passage of the Classification
Act of 1949. Since that time, the federal pay system has done quite well in establishing internal
fairness and equality for workers within its purview. Starting in the 1970s, however, the General
Schedule has fallen under increasing criticism for its failure to provide federal workers with an
incentive to do better work or take on more demanding levels of responsibility.
Recent federal efforts to reform human capital management and increase organizational
performance have attempted to connect strategic goals with employee performance objectives.
Reforming or replacing the General Schedule has been deemed an ancillary, yet crucial, step in
this process. The plans, as carried out, typically provide top performers in federal agencies with
bonuses in addition to their base pay. A variety of test programs have been authorized and
executed to evaluate the efficacy of these programs.
Academic research suggests that the type of pay scheme implemented by an organization
can have many unintended impacts. The General Schedule is an internally rigid system that
reduces subjectivity in employee evaluations, but it does this by sacrificing rewards for high
achievers. Pay-for-performance systems respond well to the accomplishments of hard workers,
but also introduce a larger degree of subjectivity into the system by providing monetary rewards
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based on supervisory evaluations. If this subjectivity is not properly controlled, it could result in
increased levels of discrimination within the organization.
When the Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation (No
FEAR) Act of 2002 was passed, it required federal agencies to collect data on discrimination
complaints within each agency on a yearly basis. These data, once collected, must be published
in all agencies’ websites. Complaint activity is broken down in these reports based on total
numbers of complaints, the basis of complaints, complaints actually resulting in a finding of
discrimination, the processing time of complaints, and many more categories. The data create a
very detailed view of each agency’s discrimination levels and provide a useful medium for
analyzing the impacts pay-for-performance reforms have within an agency.
The purpose of this study is to identify and describe any discriminatory impacts pay-forperformance reforms might cause within public organizations. This research identified three
particular programs, those carried out by Government Accountability Office, Securities and
Exchange Commission, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, for evaluation. These
agencies were chosen due to their similarities. All three instituted their pay system reforms at a
similar point in time, have comparable numbers of employees, and are independent federal
agencies. These organizations make up the experimental group of this research. Controlling for
size and type of agency reinforces the validity of the results in that they are not subject to
unpredictable influences resulting from the variations.
Nine other agencies were selected as a control group against which the experimental
group was compared. No agencies in the control group have implemented pay-for-performance
reforms. However, they do retain the other common similarities of the experimental group. The
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control group was comprised of other independent federal agencies with at least 1,000
employees.
By utilizing time series analyses and independent samples t-tests to examine the EEOC
data provided by the agencies, the study found no connection between pay-for-performance
reforms and discrimination. Three hypotheses were tested that led the research to this conclusion.
First, it was hypothesized that the control group would have a lower rate of discrimination
complaints than the experimental group. Next, the research anticipated that the post-intervention
totals for the experimental group would be higher than the pre-intervention totals. Lastly, SEC
was predicted to have a significantly lower incident rate of discrimination reporting than FDIC or
GAO due to its strict internal review process. In all cases, the statistical analysis returned results
that showed no significant difference between the variables. Therefore, all three hypotheses were
rejected and it was determined that pay-for-performance reforms had no discernable impact on
organizational discrimination levels.
The time series analysis did provide interesting insight into employee reactions to the
policy introduction. For each agency in the experimental group, the year immediately following
the reforms displayed a marked increase in discrimination complaints. Within a few years of the
initial introduction of the reforms, complaint activity had returned to levels similar to what was
observed prior to the policy intervention. This trend seems to indicate a linkage between pay-forperformance reform and the initial perception of discrimination among employees. Actual
findings of discrimination did not increase during this time and complaint levels, so no
connection can be made between the pay system changes and discrimination.
Future administrators considering implementing adjustments or reforms to their existing
pay structures may wish to carefully consider the impacts such changes have on their workers.
iv

Having one’s pay altered or being passed over for a bonus is not easily taken by most, and
without understanding the new system, many employees may find it to be discriminatory in
nature. This study concludes that while continual consideration should always be given to the
discriminatory impacts new policies may have on employees, prudent public managers should
educate their subordinates on the specifics of new pay systems before they are introduced.
Communication with employees and the consideration of feedback and suggestions from them
occur on a continual basis. This recursive cycle will ultimately lead to plans that attract a wider
base of support, facilitate compromise between staff and managers, and reduce the amount of
apprehension found among employees after the programs are implemented.
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Introduction
Upon entering office, each new president will undoubtedly face the issue of federal
government reform. The topic is inherently related to the responsibilities and duties each
president fulfills. President Roosevelt rapidly expanded the size and purview of the federal
government during the 1930s and 1940s, firmly establishing a model of government similar to
what is still present today. This expansion of the federal government generated a new interest in
analyzing public sector productivity. Not only has the efficiency and efficacy of the federal
government come under increasing scrutiny since the New Deal, but so too have those who work
within it. Academics, advocacy groups, and even various agencies within the federal government
have all created plans to increase federal employees’ productivity and efficiency.
Recent presidents have attempted to confront these issues in efforts to update and
revolutionize the administrative world. President Ronald Reagan implemented the policy of
devolution, where the administration of many public programs and funding of personnel systems
was relegated to the states. This, it was believed, would reduce bureaucracy and increase
responsiveness. President Clinton focused on quality management. He launched the National
Performance Review, headed by Vice President Gore, to identify areas and ideas where
government could be streamlined and made more efficient (Breul and Kamensky, 2008). Most
recently, President Bush applied private sector approaches to federal agencies through his
Management Agenda (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2002). The new emphasis under
President Bush’s plan focused on strengthening accountability and organizational performance
1

rather than radically reforming hierarchy or shifting power. President Bush’s new agenda
effectively revitalized a decades-old discussion about civil service reform and the proper use of
merit and performance-based incentives (Breul and Kamensky, 2008).
Systems that remunerate employees based on individual or group performance, better
known as pay-for-performance systems, are commonly found in the private sector. These types
of schemes reward workers with a predetermined amount of money for each measurement of
success completed satisfactorily. Even though this type of system is used widely outside of
government, it still signals a radical shift in the pay paradigm commonly held by most federal
workers. The success rate of such reforms in the public sector has been mixed, and scholars have
found evidence in support of and against performance-based pay systems in government
agencies.
Most of the literature published on this topic as it relates to public agencies has focused
on evaluating the efficacy and promising nature of these reforms. Variables such as efficiency,
effectiveness, productivity, and quality of work have all been examined in detail. Very few
researchers have focused on the unforeseen impacts of these reforms, however. This research
examines whether performance-based pay systems have any impact on the amount of
discrimination within an agency. Existing theory suggests that making such changes will cause a
change in the level of organizational discrimination. It is not only relevant but also vitally
important to research these issues as government takes on the task of modernizing the federal
service.
The General Schedule System currently covers about 70 percent of all federal employees
and does well to establish a culture of fairness and equality within agencies. Despite this positive
aspect of the system, it has received increasing levels of criticism throughout recent decades.
2

Scholars and civil servants have decried it as being outdated and inefficient. They claim that its
restrictive and rigid properties prevent government from acquiring and retaining the critical
talent it needs to run well. To confront these challenges, alternatives for replacing the General
Schedule System, such as performance-based systems, have been offered by many experts in the
field. Again, it is very important to consider the unforeseen effects that might be caused as a
result of changes in remuneration systems as government attempts to update itself and challenge
the underlying assumptions of older models.
Congress and the Office of Personnel Management have been eager to allow independent
agencies to pursue their own pay schedules and plans in recent years. It is hoped that this
experimentation will allow government to test the ability of new systems to bring about the
changes people are looking for. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Government Accountability Office (GAO) have all received
authorization from one or both of the aforementioned bodies to implement performance-based
reforms in their pay systems. GAO has been particularly influential in the recent push for federal
reform, authoring numerous reports that detail the successes of current changes and advocate
heavily for more expansive performance-based improvements across a broader range of federal
agencies.
Using EEOC data collected and published as a requirement of the Notification and
Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation (No FEAR) Act of 2002, a comparison
will be carried out between three agencies that have implemented performance-based pay
changes and nine other independent agencies that have not. By contrasting the levels of
discrimination claims and findings between the two groups, a picture should emerge detailing the
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exact impact the changes had on workplace discrimination within the agencies. This research
examines the discrimination complaint levels within each organization.
Assessing whether performance-based pay systems cause a change in the amount of
discrimination experienced within agencies is vital to the discussion of government reform. The
movement for finding an alternative to the General Schedule System is spreading. As this
exploration continues and the tendency to adopt such reforms gains popularity among agencies
and departments, understanding the underlying discriminatory effects, if any should exist, is
absolutely essential to forming a better system. The new system must implement accountability
and performance initiatives in a way that aligns well with the principles of fairness and equity.

Describing the Pay Systems
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 implemented major initiatives to motivate civil
service employees by rewarding high achievers. By establishing the merit system, which allows
federal agencies to provide incentives and rewards to the hardest working employees, it was
assumed these principles would lead to a revitalized and more productive civil service.
Unfortunately, the federal merit system has been largely ineffective since its inception to produce
major productivity benefits. Federal employees have traditionally had a difficult time linking pay
to performance under the system (Pearce and Perry, 1983). Over the decades, the merit system
has become more of an insulating feature of federal employment, which keeps political pressures
from whimsically affecting workers’ future, rather than an impetus for increased productivity.
The Office of Personnel Management was tasked with the oversight and administration of
the General Schedule after the passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Under this
system, individual employees receive yearly increases in pay based on their particular level of
4

employment, also known as a step. Seniority, or time spent within an organization, tends to be
the predominant factor for promotions and increases in pay, not performance. Most employees
are eligible for advancing to the next grade level after a certain amount of time, usually one year.
Each grade in the General Schedule corresponds to a classification regarding the type of work
being performed by the individual. As such, grades within the General Schedule usually relate
more to an employee’s rank within the hierarchy of an organization than the market value of his
or her skills (Milakovich and Gordon, 2004, 304-315).
There are many benefits of this General Schedule System, however. For example,
employees covered under the General Schedule must rarely worry about their yearly increase in
pay, as it is prescribed and set into law by Congress. The system is internally fair and embodies
the philosophy of “equal pay for equal work.” The classification system also allows for
employees to transfer easily between agencies, as their job, grade level, and specific step held
relate directly to their positions in the previous agencies’ hierarchy. As Kim (1988, 109)
observed, “merit pay includes the element of scientism, which emphasizes objectivity and
accuracy in placing workers in appropriate positions and rewarding them with appropriate pay.”
Not all observers see a need to reform the federal service, and some completely denounce the
current movement of market-based reforms. Claims exist that such reforms are incompatible
with the nature of government service and that “the performance paradigm compromises the
capacity of the civil servant to act according to public service ideals” (Thompson, 2006, 498).
The Government Accountability Office has been one of the most vociferous proponents
of federal strategic performance reforms. As such, it is of little surprise that the agency has
undertaken one of the most extensive initiatives within the federal government to reform its
compensation system. GAO implemented a policy to band its pay levels and adjust them to more
5

accurately reflect market trends for employees in the same positions or with the same education
levels and skills. The system became most noteworthy in 2005 after the passage of the GAO
Human Capital Reform Act of 2004. The agency continuously reevaluates and adjusts its pay
scales to ensure continued reflection of private sector offerings. Using a tiered system, GAO
ranks employees’ performance on five levels. The total compensation for performance-based
salary adjustments is determined by calculating the percentage of salaries within each band. The
organization does not use a pooling or review board technique in evaluating employee
performance audits. In FY 2006, GAO gave an average adjustment of 2.6 percent to those
employees who received a satisfactory evaluation (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2007,
23; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007; Walker, 2007).
In 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission executed its own pay-for-performance
system. The system initially assesses the individual performance of an employee in a binary
fashion, labeling performance as either acceptable or unacceptable. The second part of the
process allows employees and supervisors to submit written statements highlighting the findings
of the evaluation. Once this is done, the supervisors place the respective employee into one of
four categories. A committee devoted to the review of this process then assesses the comments of
both the supervisor and employee and the category the employee was placed in by the
supervisor. The final evaluation is retained by the committee, who will place the employee into a
step from 0 – 3. This placement reflects the actual amount of bonus pay the individual employee
will receive (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2007, 29; U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2008).
The FDIC also has a performance-based pay system originating in 1998. The most recent
and significant changes occurred in 2003, however, when the reforms began to impact lower6

level staff. There are two separate systems covering all employees, one for senior managers and
another for all bargaining unit and non-bargaining unit personnel, within the agency. Increases in
pay are closely tied to individual contributions to organizational goals. After an employee
receives a satisfactory evaluation, he or she is placed into one of four pools of employees who
performed similarly well. Performance-based bonuses are awarded after the individual is
compared to other peers in the same pool (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2007, 27).
To illustrate the pay-for-performance systems further: if a carpenter gets paid $100 for
every new chair s/he makes, a policy analyst at GAO might get put into the next highest category
for bonuses each time s/he contributes directly and unambiguously to the agency’s strategic
goals. To continue the analogy, if the carpenter makes no chairs, s/he gets no pay. If an employee
at GAO, FDIC, or SEC does not meet expectations for the year, s/he receives no bonus or
increase in pay.
By understanding the differences between the individual systems and the General
Schedule, several disparate approaches to federal pay emerge. The General Schedule is a system
based on longevity within civil service and does very little to promote productivity. Merit pay
was originally thought of as a way to encourage federal employees to work harder by adding
incentives to their routines. Ultimately, this did very little to influence or inspire civil servants.
Performance-based pay systems are the latest attempt at increasing government efficiency by
directly linking pay to performance and the closest scheme white-collar federal employees have
to actual output-based pay.
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Literature Review
Pay-for-Performance systems are rooted in expectancy theory and reinforcement theory
(Perry, Engbers, and Jun, 2009). Taken together, they provide a foundation and explanation for
why performance-based systems work. Each framework provides an explanation for how
incentives in the remuneration schemes compel employees to work harder and create better
work. Keeping the discussion relevant to this research, discrimination, if shown to exist in the
data, would undermine both theories and remove the incentivizing factors for employees within
the performance-based systems.
Expectancy theory ties effort to outcome. If an employee believes that exerting more
effort or performing better in a particular way within a job will attract more rewards, and the
employee values those rewards, then s/he will work harder in order to obtain the rewards
(Vroom, 1964). It has also been shown that individuals will attempt to optimize their situations
by comparing the immediate choices available rather than holding each choice to an independent
standard. This process is a display of an individual’s attempt to maximize personal outcome and
reward (Behling and Starke 1973). When discrimination is observable and rampant, this
comparison might encourage employees to quickly assess their situation and seek out new
agencies or sectors for work. These theories show that discrimination could undermine the ability
for performance-based reforms to create the desired changes.
If expectancy theory can be summarized as compelling one to choose to perform better,
then reinforcement theory can be thought of as training for an individual to do so. That is,
reinforcement theory places importance on the current act (typically performance) and the
consequences (positive or negative) of that act. Over time, pay can reinforce good behaviors
(high performance) and lead to a more productive workforce. For performance-based systems,
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the opportunity for bonuses continually motivates and trains an employee to work hard in order
to obtain established goals (Perry, Mesch, and Paarlberg, 2006).
Performance-based compensation systems have been demonstrated to reduce the amount
of organizational discrimination due to inequities in pay. As Heywood and O’Halloran (2005,
449) found, “evidence presented suggests that the racial wage differential is smaller for those
receiving output pay. Output-based pay schemes provide more objective information on
productivity than do typical supervisory evaluations.” Heywood and O’Halloran’s (2005)
research is predicated upon the assumption that performance-based pay schemes remove
subjectivity from decision making within individual systems. Each worker receives a predefined
increase in pay for every new unit of productivity. This removes the often arbitrary nature of
supervisor evaluations, thus reducing the amount of bias in the system. Moreover, this type of
system makes discrimination more easily observed. The repercussions in the form of legal
settlements, fines, and damage to an organization’s reputation make the cost for discrimination
high, lessening the chance of it actually occurring (Becker, 1971; Heywood and O’Halloran,
2005). As observed, evaluations introduce bias and subjectivity into a system and often account,
at least partially, for discrepancies between race and gender pay levels.
The performance-based systems implemented by GAO, FDIC, and SEC have a
methodological review process that deviates slightly from the research performed by Heywood
and O’Halloran, whose assumptions are based on the framework of tangible outputs.
Unfortunately, most work produced by government agencies is of an intangible nature.
Employees of federal agencies are frequently called upon to complete tasks that require mental,
rather than physical, skills. Work produced might be in the form of reports or portions of reports,
which makes assessing the output difficult and raises several questions. These questions include,
9

but are not limited to, the following: In a performance-based pay system, should a policy analyst
be remunerated for the amount of reports authored in a given year? Does the total length of the
reports matter? Should the quality of the reports be considered as well? Is the amount of impact
that resulted from the reports important for consideration during evaluations?
Attempting to take issues of fairness and objectivity into account throughout the
evaluation process, the systems at GAO, SEC, and FDIC have internal mechanisms that
discourage and remove discrimination. However, if bias were to occur, it should have a much
larger impact on the affected employee than within the General Schedule, where s/he would be
insured a yearly increase regardless of review. Because of this, Heywood and O’Halloran’s
(2005) model must be revised for applicability in this study. Pay-for-performance systems within
these agencies attempt to disambiguate and standardize the tasks of individuals within the
organizations. However, the process is not as mechanical as for the public employee as it is for
the carpenter or sales person, who is paid an additional sum for each unit of output. All three
systems rely upon evaluations from superiors to measure initial performance. It is virtually
impossible to eliminate all forms of favoritism and subjectivity from performance reviews.
Should the internal controls for removing bias be ineffective within these systems, the
ability for discrimination to occur is much more likely. Elvira and Town (2001) found that
workplace performance evaluations are highly dependent upon the race of the supervisor(s) and
subordinate. Racial differences in pay discovered during their research are directly dependent
upon the bias and subjectivity of the evaluator. When an evaluator is a different race than that of
the employee being evaluated, the evaluator is much more likely to discount the employee on the
basis of his or her race. The resulting lower score on the evaluation then directly impacts the
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future pay of the employee. One can see from this study just how significantly race can impact
evaluations.
Additional studies have shown how wages in jobs traditionally filled by women pay
much lower than sectors dominated by men (Bridges and Nelson, 1989). These disparities are
attributable to a variety of contextual factors including sociological and economic elements.
However, the study suggests that if the current trend to mirror government salaries to those
within the private market continues, those roles in government that are similar to womendominated professions in the private sector could face suppressed wages. This is congruent with
the observations of other research, which found that performance-based systems actually
exacerbate this phenomenon (Elvira and Graham, 2002). Meyer observes that “a merit pay plan
rests on the assumption that a supervisor can make objective and valid distinctions between the
performances of various individual who report to him” (Meyer, 1975, 41).
Evaluations of employees are, by their very nature, often highly subjective. Attempts
have been made within the reformed agencies (GAO, FDIC, and SEC) to make the process as
fair and scientific as possible, but it would be difficult to imagine a system where all bias was
removed. Studies show that performance appraisals impact the efficacy of performance-based
remuneration. When evaluations are unfair, or simply perceived to be so, the efficacy of the
entire pay system can be undermined. Employees perception of the system is essential to
building a successful program (Perry, Engbers, and Jun, 2009). To describe this more accurately,
the General Schedule System is actually more like the output-based pay discussed by Heywood
and O’Halloran (2005), due to its lack of ambiguity or the influence of supervisory subjectivity.
From this perspective, this study’s first two hypotheses emerge. H1: Agencies that implement
pay-for-performance reforms will have higher incident rates of discrimination. H2: Within the
11

experimental group, the pre-intervention means will be significantly lower than the postinterventional means.
The three agencies being reviewed have developed their pay system reforms
autonomously. Ideas might have been gleaned from previous and existing projects, but each
system was developed independently within the individual agency. The systems, developed as
they were, have different banding systems, pay structures, and evaluation processes. Evaluation
processes at SEC seem to be more focused on controlling bias than at GAO or FDIC. As
previously mentioned, the SEC has a supervisor appraisal, followed by the employee being
allowed to add his or her own argument to the evaluation, which is finally reviewed by a
committee to ensure the supervisor’s findings were appropriate. GAO and FDIC also have
systems in place to remove subjectivity from the evaluation process, but their systems are not as
stringent as the process at the SEC. Given these observations, a third hypothesis becomes
apparent. H3: Among the three agencies that have implemented performance-based pay reforms,
post-intervention discrimination at SEC will be lower than at FDIC or GAO, due to the internal
controls on bias during SEC employee evaluations.

Methodology
Pursuant to the No FEAR Act of 2002, each federal agency is required to publish a yearly
report that details the occurrences of discrimination within each organization. The data contained
within these reports are useful for this analysis because they are uniformly collected information
on the number of complaints alleging discrimination filed during a given year, the total number
of complainants filing the grievances, the alleged basis upon which the discrimination occurred,
the issue from which the complaint resulted, and the total number of actual findings of
12

discrimination as determined by agency investigation or adjudication. As such, the figures
published by the agencies provide a means for undertaking a comprehensive comparative
analysis of the agencies that have implemented pay-for-performance reforms and those that have
not.
In total, 12 agencies were included in the research, and each represents the study’s unit of
analysis. GAO, SEC, and FDIC were the only three completely independent federal agencies
meeting our size criterion that have implemented performance-based pay changes. Other quasiindependent agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, have implemented similar changes,
but were excluded from this analysis because they are within a larger federal department (IRS
being a part of the Department of Treasury). It was determined that focusing on independent
agencies, free of larger departmental cultures, would eliminate additional bias from the analysis.
Excluding agencies with under 1,000 employees ensured that the agencies included in the
evaluation were large enough to produce meaningful data. Numbers from small agencies, none
of which had performance-based reforms implemented, would be of little contribution to the
study. The other nine agencies included have not implemented remunerative reforms similar to
GAO, SEC, or FDIC. As such, they serve as a control group for the analysis. See Appendix C for
a listing of all agencies within the control group.
Time-series analyses are used to describe and compare the trends among both the control
and experimental groups. Additionally, means analyses are utilized for more accurate and
descriptive comparisons for testing the aforementioned hypotheses. Given the data available, this
methodology allows for trends in EEOC complaints to be established before and after the
independent variable’s introduction. Should a similar trend be found among all agencies within a
particular group after the intervention is introduced, a compelling case might be made in support
13

of or against the aforementioned hypotheses. Additionally, by comparing the results found within
the experimental group to those among the control group, the findings should be even more
substantiated.
The independent variable, performance-pay reforms, was tracked among the three
agencies that made the changes and compared during those same years to the EEOC data for
agencies that still use the General Schedule System. The dependent variable is the total number
of complaints contained within each agency’s yearly publications on discrimination (race,
gender, age, religious affiliation, and all Title V protected classes). The data collected are
thorough and allow for analysis of the same dependent variable across the experimental and
control groups. Since all data collected were secondary in nature, no considerable ethical
concerns arise.
To make the numbers meaningful, the data collected by the agencies were converted to
percentages based on the total number of employees within each agency for a given year. For
example, if an agency had 100 complaints of discrimination during FY2006 and also had 1,000
employees, the data collected were converted to represent this as 10 percent. Otherwise,
comparing complaint levels from agencies with 1,000 employees to those with 10,000 would
make very little sense. One hundred complaints during a year within a smaller agency would be
much more significant than the same number within a tremendously larger organization. All
numbers for employment for a fiscal year within each agency were taken from the database
through the Office of Personnel Management’s website, also known as FedScope. The
Government Accountability Office, an agency under the direct supervision of Congress, does not
have data collected within the FedScope database on its yearly employment statistics. Because of
this, alternative means were sought to indentify the numbers. The employment numbers for GAO
14

were taken from the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government, an annual study conducted
by the Partnership for Public Service and the Institute of Public Policy and Implementation at the
School of Public Affairs at American University. These data did not include the employment
numbers for GAO during FY 2007, however. This number was found within the 2007 GAO
Performance and Accountability Report.
The pay-for-performance changes were implemented several years ago in all the agencies
within the experimental group. The data, collected before and after the reforms, should provide a
worthwhile analysis for assessing the changes in organizational discrimination amongst the
groups and within the experimental group. To test the hypotheses, multiple measures were taken.
Pre- and post-intervention means were compiled and examined for the experimental group, an
analysis was performed of only the post-intervention means within the experimental group, and
the post-intervention means for the experimental group were compared to the total means of the
control group.
All data among the agencies were collected and organized by fiscal year. This process,
while being as thorough and complete as possible for each individual agency, does leave gaps in
some areas of the data. Agencies began and ended collecting data at different times. The Office
of Personnel Management, for example, has the most extensive employment data available on
the agencies, covering all years from 2000 to present. However, the Social Security
Administration only has EEOC data published from 2006 to present. Most agencies began
posting their No FEAR data in 2003, which provides a solid foundation for analysis, so any data
lacking in the years after this should be relatively inconsequential to this study. The amount of
data and type of analysis being conducted should overcome these deficiencies.
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Findings
While the research produced a better understanding of the impact pay-for-performance
reforms on organizational discrimination, a number of other, ancillary findings were discovered
as well. To best understand the dynamics of the impacts, the discussion of the findings takes both
standard time series and regression models into account.
Using an interrupted time series model (Appendix G), the impact of transitioning from a
standardized pay system, like that of the General Schedule, to one that links performance with
remuneration is clearly illustrated. In all three agencies within the experimental group, total
EEOC claims alleging discriminatory treatment rose in the years immediately following the
introduction of the performance-based pay reforms. For GAO and SEC, the increase in
complaints filed was drastic, while the increase for FDIC was only mild. Nevertheless, all three
agencies did experience an initial increase in EEOC complaint activity.
Once the policy had been established for a number of years, the number of EEOC
complaints within all agencies had returned to levels similar to those before the policy
intervention. In the case of FDIC, the number of EEOC complaints filed in 2008 was less than
half of the pre-intervention total of FY2003. For the other two agencies, GAO and SEC,
complaint levels two years after the initial introduction of the policy were at similar levels to the
pre-intervention data.
The abrupt rises and declines around the policy intervention for the experimental
agencies display a significant event. While other factors could have influenced the data and
caused a similar spike in complaint levels, it is unlikely that the same occurrence happened at all
three agencies at exactly the necessary time to produce such a result. The policy interventions
occurred during a different year for all three agencies, yet the same results are found amongst the
16

three agencies. Thus, it is highly improbably that the same unpredicted interruption occurred at
each agency at the precise year needed to produce these results.
GAO had the largest single-year increase of the three agencies. Complaints within the
agency rose almost 700 percent from FY2005 to FY2006. During FY2004 and FY2005, GAO
had only received 5 total complaints alleging discrimination, or only 0.15 percent of all
employees. By the end of FY2006, a full year into the pay-for-performance reforms, GAO faced
35 complaints of discrimination, or 1.07 percent of its total workforce. By the end of FY2008,
levels had settled around the pre-intervention levels.
The changes to remuneration policy at SEC occurred in 2003. The available data did not
extend to data points prior to the policy intervention. However, if 2003 is considered a baseline
for the time series analysis, which is acceptable due to time lag, the findings display a significant
increase in the reported number of EEOC claims in FY2004. Similar to GAO, the spike in the
number of claims is immediately followed by an abrupt decline in subsequent years. Unlike
GAO, the most recent observation points on the time line for SEC display complaint levels much
lower than the pre-intervention totals.
FDIC implemented its pay-for-performance policy in 2004. The numbers of EEOC
complaints within the agency rose from that time through FY2006, but not as dramatically as
SEC or GAO levels. Following FY2006, the numbers had begun to decline, and by FY2008,
numbers of complaints had dropped to 13, or 0.26 percent of the workforce. The most recent data
point is less than half of the number of complaints filed immediately preceding the policy
intervention.
The scope of the data available on GAO, FDIC, and SEC was limited, but not so much so
as to impact the findings of the study. The No FEAR Act, which requires the documentation and
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publication of EEOC data, was passed in 2002. Almost all the 12 agencies in the study had no
data available prior to FY2003. The pay-for-performance reforms were implemented in 2003 at
SEC, so the policy intervention and beginning of the analysis of EEOC data occurred
contemporaneously. Thus, there is no way to ascertain the behavior of data prior to the
introduction of the reforms. Luckily, however, the reforms only manifested in relevant data
trends in the fiscal year following implementation. For practical purposes, the fiscal year in
which the intervention occurred could be thought of as the last data point for the pre-intervention
model. Once the policy to remunerate based on performance was established in any of the
analyzed agencies, complaints did not begin to appear in the data until the following year due to
the time the agencies’ processes take to undertake employee review and make decisions affecting
pay.

The Perception of Discrimination
The dramatic changes in EEOC complaint activity directly following the policy
intervention within the evaluated agencies initially suggest to the observer that pay-forperformance programs do indeed impact the level of discrimination within an organization.
However, when compared to the adjudicated levels of cases determined to actually be
discrimination, a different picture emerges.
Actual findings of discrimination were rare among the three agencies in the experimental
group. GAO had no findings of any discrimination during the entire period from FY2003
through FY 2008. Only one case of discrimination was discovered in the same time frame at
FDIC. The case, adjudicated in FY2008, happened long after the initial intervention occurred. As
such, it is difficult to establish if the pay-for-performance policy contributed in any manner to the
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occurrence. At SEC, there was, again, only one finding of discrimination, which took place in
2005. While this incidence happened in a time span close to the policy intervention, it also arose
as total complaints of discrimination within the agency were in a precipitous decline. The total
number of adjudications of discrimination within the experimental group does not constitute a
significant finding that might indict the performance-based systems for elevating organizational
levels of discrimination.
A more relevant and useful observation of this trend might focus less on actual
discrimination and more on perceived discrimination. That is, the spikes in complaint data with
little to no corroborating data of actual discrimination suggest that employees within the
organizations at least feel like they are being discriminated against. This in no way undermines
the importance of understanding this trend; perceived injustice can be just as damaging to an
agency as actual discrimination. A prudent public manager might find it wise to educate his or
her organization extensively about the proposed changes and work closely with staff to tailor the
plans precisely to the needs of the organization and expectations of employees.

Comparing to the Control Group
Comparing the rise in complaint activity of the experimental group to the same data for
the control group produced very interesting results. However, since the control group was not
exposed to the intervening variable, a standard interrupted time series analysis is of little use
when trying to compare the control and experimental groups. Instead, an independent samples
t-test was employed to analyze the data. This method allowed for the first hypothesis (H1) to be
tested. H1 hypothesized that agencies that did not implement pay-for-performance reforms
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would have lower levels of discrimination complaints.
The results of the independent samples t-test entirely contradict the above hypothesis. For
the comparison, only the post-intervention data from the experimental group was compared to
the data from the control group. After completing the analysis, it was discovered that the mean of
all EEOC complaints for the years following the policy intervention in the experimental group
was lower than the complaint level for the control group.
Since the significance of the Levene’s Test is 0.328, much larger than 0.05, the results of
the t-test can be considered equivalent and included in the findings. The results show, however,
that there is not a significant difference between the totals of the control and experimental
groups. Assuming equal variances or not, the significance is above 0.1 for both groups (0.130
assuming equal variances and 0.113 if not assuming equal variances). While the mean of the
experimental group is lower than that of the control group, it is not significantly lower. That
being the case, H1 must be rejected. The findings show no significant difference in the totals.
There is no certainty that any significant difference in discrimination levels exists between the
two groups. Statistically speaking, they are equivalent. Appendix B has the detailed statistics
report for this finding.

Analyzing the Experimental Group
H2 hypothesized that the post-intervention means within the experimental group would
be significantly higher than the pre-intervention means. A means analysis was again employed
using an independent samples t-test. The difference of the means between the experimental and
control groups was not significant. In two of the agencies, the post-intervention mean was higher
(GAO and SEC). FDIC had a post-intervention mean that was 0.0000017 lower than pre20

interventional mean. The post-interventional mean for SEC was slightly larger than the preintervention mean. GAO, again having the most drastic change in complaint totals, had a postintervention mean that was more than three times the pre-interventional mean.
Like the findings comparing the means of the experimental and control groups, none of
the post-intervention means were statistically significant from pre-intervention means. GAO was
the agency closest to the 0.05 significance level, with SEC and FDIC much further from
significance. This being the case, H2 is rejected. The difference between the pre- and postintervention means for the experimental group is not significant. See Appendix C for more
details on the results of the t-test results.
H3 posited that SEC, due to the strict internal controls limiting subjectivity throughout
the performance review process, would have the lowest rates of discrimination complaints after
the intervening variable was introduced. To test this, means were again compared using an
independent samples t-test (Appendix D). After reviewing the post-intervention means, SEC did
indeed have the lowest level of discrimination complaints, with a mean of 0.0041445. FDIC had
the highest mean of the group at 0.0064283. GAO had a post-intervention mean that was
between the aforementioned agencies’ totals. The mean for GAO was closer to FDIC’s mean
than SEC’s. Testing the difference of the means between SEC and the other agencies showed
that the difference was not significant. H3 is rejected. The difference is not significant enough
for the research to conclude that SEC’s means were significantly lower than GAO or FDIC.

Conclusion
Pay-for-performance initiatives are gaining increasing levels of popularity at all levels of
government. The findings from this research suggest that these reforms have had no short-term
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effects on the levels of discrimination within the agencies that have implemented the changes.
No positive or negative impact could be ascertained from the means analyses. The time-series
analysis did produce evidence that would be of use to public administrators considering
implementing pay-for-performance reforms.
This analysis created demonstrable evidence that actual discrimination should not be an
impediment to agencies implementing pay system reforms. There were no significant changes in
the number of discrimination complaints within the individual agencies’ pre- and postintervention totals. Additionally, the difference between the post-intervention mean of SEC
(which had the lowest post-intervention mean) when compared to the means of GAO and FDIC
was not significant. Finally, there was no statistically significant difference in the means of the
experimental and control groups. Through testing for all three hypotheses, the evidence clearly
indicates that no discernable connection exists, positive or negative, between pay-forperformance reform and discrimination complaint levels.

Education, Outreach, and Compromise
While there was no evidence to suggest that pay system reform impacted individual
agency discrimination levels in a positive or negative manner, there is evidence to suggest that
employees initially perceive a negative impact. The time-series analysis displayed a common
trend among all of the agencies within the experimental group. The trend, a sudden and
precipitous increase in discrimination complaints in the first and second years following the
introduction of the reforms, with no corroborating increases in adjudicated cases of
discrimination, suggests that employees perceive the system to be unfair and discriminatory.
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After the first few years, this sudden increase in complaints drops back down to levels
typical of what was observed prior to the reforms’ implementation. This quick decline of
complaint levels indicates that as time passes and the employees become more accustomed to the
new system, their apprehension toward it decreases. The decline in complaints could also be
attributable to compromises reached between the agencies and the employees through
negotiations. GAO employees attempted to unionize in the years following the reforms at the
agency (Rutzick, 2007).
Administrators considering pay system reforms should be less concerned about actual
discrimination and more interested in reaching out to the employees of their organizations prior
to, during, and after the implementation of the changes. This is not to say that managers of public
organizations should lose sight of the possibility of organizational discrimination. The possibility
of this occurring remains in any and all systems, and should always be a continuing
consideration. The findings of this research, however, suggest that if new pay systems are
implemented correctly, discrimination should not be an impeding concern. More importantly,
administrators considering the reforms should be focused on education, outreach, and
compromise when implementing the reforms.
Before embarking upon any implementation of pay system reforms, administrators
should have a well-planned program to present to the employees. Properly educating employees
on the details of the changes should either garner their support or elicit feedback. Suggestions
and comments provided by employees would need to be incorporated into the plans. As the
process moves into implementation, employees need to be approached and again educated and
listened to. The recursive nature of this process should provide both management and employees
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with the knowledge of what is needed and a method of collaboration to produce a plan that
accommodates most parties, thus reducing the initial shock of the changes.

Call for Future Research
The push for federal pay reform to take a performance-based approach will ultimately
have positive and negative implications. Many studies have already been conducted on the
efficacy of these systems, spanning from the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to the more
contemporary approaches as part of President Bush’s Performance Agenda. There is a profound
and recognizable need to analyze other repercussions that could theoretically result from such
changes in remunerations systems. After all, increased efficacy and efficiency within the federal
public service is an admirable goal to seek, but reaching this goal while jeopardizing the careers
or remuneration of others is unacceptable.
While the findings in this paper suggest that no connection between pay-for-performance
reforms and discrimination exists, future research should seek to verify this finding within the
different EEOC-protected classes. Total discrimination was the major dependent variable
analyzed in this research. This is by no means, however, the only aspect that could be impacted
by performance-based reforms, and even within this variable a more nuanced analysis should be
undertaken in future research. The No FEAR Act of 2002 also requires agencies to report on
specific categories of complaints, such as race, age, gender, national origin, and all other legally
protected classes. Future research might find it useful to analyze these specific categories to
establish a more detailed view of this topic. Where the data are available, these same techniques
might be usefully employed to evaluate these effects at lower levels of government as well.
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In addition to testing within more EEOC related variables, future researchers may find it
prudent to examine the effects pay systems reforms have on trust and morale within
organizations. These studies could advance the field of knowledge on the evidence discovered in
the time-series analysis utilized in this research, which suggested an initial perception of
discrimination amongst the employees. Agencies with demoralized or untrusting employees
might find decreased levels of productivity and heightened levels of turnover (Perry, Engbers,
and Jun, 2009).
The data used in this study contained a relatively short time frame for analysis. The No
Fear Act was passed in 2002 and, as such, a dearth of data was available prior to 2003, when
most agencies began to comply with the provisions of the legislation. A few agencies, such as the
Social Security Administration, whose data collection began in 2006, had even shorter time
frames for reporting the data. As such, longer trends in discrimination complaint levels were not
ascertainable. More testing will be needed to further corroborate the findings in this research. As
time passes, more agencies will continue to comply with the No FEAR Act of 2002 and more
data will become available to social scientists interested in this topic. As this occurs, the initial
insight provided here could be expounded upon to further the knowledge of the topic.
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Appendix A
Differences Between Pay Systems

GAO

SEC

FDIC

Performance
Incentives

Grade/Pay Levels

Yes, evaluations
assess individual
performance and
contribution to
organizational
goals. This, in
turn, defines
bonuses.
Yes, evaluations
assess individual
performance and
contribution to
organizational
goals. This, in
turn, defines
bonuses.

Bands pay by level

Aligning salaries with
those of private
markets. Improving
accountability
through pay
incentives.

“Five-level performance
rating system, based on
employee competencies, to
evaluate employee”

Aligns pay of individual
employees with those of
private sector employees,
based upon assessment of
retained skills and education.

One system,
covering all
employees, that
uses evaluations
and a committee
review process to
give bonuses.

Aligning salaries with
those of private
markets through a
committee review
process that leads to
bonus pay.

Two-level rating system
where performance is
either acceptable or
unacceptable. Secondphase involves placing
employees into one of four
categories based on
contributions. A committee
will review evaluations and
recommend a pay increase.

Aligns pay of individual
employees with those of
private sector employees,
based upon assessment of
retained skills and education.

Yes, based on
contributions and
comparative
performance
evaluations.

Two systems: One
for senior
managers and
another for
bargaining & nonbargaining unit
employees.

Focuses on

Evaluating employees
for performance
based on “corporate
contributions” and
meeting
organizational
mission and
objectives.

Performance Evaluation/
Rating System

Employees with
“unacceptable” ratings will
not receive a pay
adjustment for the year.
Employees are assessed for
initial competency. If a
“meets expectations” rating
is received, employee is
placed into one of 4 pools
with other employees of
similar ranking.
Comparative: evaluation
considers productivity of
peers.
Employees receive a step
each year, according to
grade level. Program in
place to allow transition to
higher grades over time.

Pay Alignment

Aligns pay of individual
employees with those of
private sector employees,
based upon assessment of
retained skills and education.

Pay aligned with
15 grades or levels Internal equity,
Incentives are
organizational hierarchy. Not
with 10 steps per
external
much less
competitiveness,
highly responsive to market
grade.
pronounced.
trends
individual pay
Raises are usually
progression
linked to tenure
within the service
than to individual
performance.
( Milakovich and Gordon 2004, 304-15; U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007; U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 2007; Walker 2007)
Agencies
under the
General
Schedule and
Merit System
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Appendix B

Testing H1: Independent Samples t-Test Comparing Experimental and Control Groups

Group Statistics
Reforms
Agencies

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Control Group

9

.007479000

.0022548916

.0007516305

Experimental Group

5

.005555705

.0018229908

.0008152663

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval of the

F

Sig.

t

df

Sig. (2-

Mean

Std. Error

tailed)

Difference

Difference

Difference
Lower

Upper

Agencies Equal
variances

1.041

.328 1.626

12

.130 .0019232946

.0011828814 -.0006539826

.0045005719

1.734 10.057

.113 .0019232946

.0011088767 -.0005455447

.0043921340

assumed
Equal
variances not
assumed
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Appendix C

Testing H2: Independent Samples t-Test Experimental Group
Group Statistics
Reforms
FDICPREPOST

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Pre-Intervention

2

.0064300

.00052711

.00037273

Post-Intervention

4

.0064283

.00257719

.00128859

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval of

F

Sig.

t

df

Sig. (2-

Mean

Std. Error

tailed)

Difference

Difference

the Difference
Lower

Upper

FDICPREPOST Equal
variances

2.250

.208 .001

4

.999

.00000171

.00194632

-.00540214

.00540556

.001 3.451

.999

.00000171

.00134142

-.00396863

.00397205

assumed
Equal
variances not
assumed
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Appendix C Continued

Testing H2: Independent Samples t-Test Experimental Group

Group Statistics
Reforms
GAOPREPOST

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Pre-Intervention

3

.0019467

.00069051

.00039867

Post-Intervention

3

.0059878

.00425015

.00245383

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval of

F

Sig.

t

Sig. (2-

Mean

Std. Error

tailed)

Difference

Difference

df

the Difference
Lower

Upper

GAOPREPOST Equal
variances

6.747

.060

-1.626

4

.179 -.00404111

.00248600

-.01094335

.00286114

-1.626 2.106

.239 -.00404111

.00248600

-.01423992

.00615770

assumed
Equal
variances not
assumed
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Appendix C Continued

Testing H2: Independent Samples t-Test Experimental Group

Group Statistics
Reforms
SECPREPOST

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

Pre-Intervention

1

.0039926

.

.

Post-Intervention

5

.0041445

.00145945

.00065268

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval of

Sig.
(2F

Sig.

t

df

Mean

tailed) Difference

the Difference

Std. Error
Difference

Lower

Upper

SECPREPOST Equal variances
.

. -.095

4

.

.

.929 -.00015188

.00159874

-.00459070

.00428694

.

.

.

assumed
Equal variances
not assumed
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-.00015188

Appendix D

Testing H3: Independent Samples t-Test Comparing SEC to FDIC and GAO

Group Statistics
Std. Error
Post-Interventional Means N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Mean

SEC - FDIC SEC

5

.004144510 .0014594462

.0006526842

FDIC

4

.006428282 .0025771865

.0012885932

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test
for Equality of
Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval of the

Sig.
(2F
SEC -

Equal variances

FDIC

assumed

1.300

Sig.

.292

t

-1.689

df

Difference

Std. Error

tailed) Mean Difference

Difference

Lower

Upper

7

.135 -2.2837717397E-3

1.3522743665E-3

-5.4813925015E-3

9.1384902204E-4

-1.581 4.514

.181 -2.2837717397E-3

1.4444615635E-3

-6.1204218222E-3

1.5528783428E-3

Equal variances
not assumed

34

Appendix D Continued

Testing H3: Independent Samples t-Test Comparing SEC to FDIC and GAO

Group Statistics

Std. Error
Post-Interventional Means
SEC - GAO

N

Mean

Std. Deviation

Mean

SEC

GAO

5 .004144510

.0014594462

.0006526842

3 .005987793

.0042501507

.0024538256

Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for
Equality of Variances

t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval of the

Sig.
(2F
SEC -

Equal

GAO

variances

5.561

Sig.

.056

t

df

Difference

Std. Error

tailed) Mean Difference

Difference

Lower

Upper

-.925

6

.391 -1.8432827714E-3

1.9921511568E-3 -6.7179010462E-3

3.0313355034E-3

-.726

2.287

.535 -1.8432827714E-3

2.5391449260E-3 -1.1553228722E-2

7.8666631795E-3

assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed
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Appendix E
Complaint Level Totals
The categories listed below contain data on a single, and possibly the most descriptive,
variable. The “TOTAL” variable represents the actual number of EEOC complaints within the
specified agency for a given fiscal year. To make the data more meaningful and applicable across
agencies of different sizes, the “TOTAL %” variable was created. This variable was calculated
by dividing the total number of complaints by the total number of employees for that same fiscal
year. It is the number of complaints per employee.
Experimental Group:
GAO
TOTAL

YEAR
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

FDIC
TOTAL

9
5
5
35
15
8

GAO
TOTAL %
0.27439%
0.15361%
0.15601%
1.07362%
0.46875%
0.25397%

EEOC
TOTAL
N/A
N/A

74
72
69
76
64
73

EPA
TOTAL %
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.39106%
0.38760%
0.37504%
0.41648%
0.35375%
0.40007%
NASA
TOTAL %
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.30533%
0.20749%
0.19696%
0.26006%
0.32501%
N/A

NARA
TOTAL
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

SEC
TOTAL

33
36
33
38
35
13

FDIC
TOTAL %
0.60573%
0.68027%
0.71848%
0.83498%
0.75464%
0.26321%

46
39
33
26
21
28
37

EEOC
TOTAL %
N/A
N/A
1.65706%
1.50696%
1.33874%
1.10030%
0.95672%
1.27737%
1.67800%

GSA
TOTAL
N/A
N/A
N/A

NRC
TOTAL
N/A
N/A
N/A

12
10
18
13
10

NARA
TOTAL %
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.40282%
0.32862%
0.59642%
0.43874%
0.31857%

13
25
17
13
11
11

SEC
TOTAL %
0.39926%
0.65841%
0.43512%
0.36131%
0.31447%
0.30295%

Control Group:

YEAR
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

YEAR
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

EPA
TOTAL
N/A
N/A
N/A

NASA
TOTAL
N/A
N/A
N/A
58
40
37
48
60
N/A

36

111
89
68
101
77
N/A

9
12
10
13
11
13

GSA
TOTAL %
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.88060%
0.70652%
0.53687%
0.82991%
0.64188%
N/A
NRC
TOTAL %
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.28635%
0.37221%
0.30349%
0.37228%
0.29333%
0.31863%

Appendix E Continued
Complaint Level Totals

OPM
TOTAL

YEAR
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

35
38
19
28
66
54
36
32
19

OPM
TOTAL %
0.93909%
1.06922%
0.52026%
0.78409%
1.80921%
1.05737%
0.68234%
0.55411%
0.32451%

SBA
TOTAL
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
40
38
34
40

37

SBA
TOTAL %
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.92550%
0.60625%
0.75606%
0.82833%

SSA TOTAL
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
394
402
466

SSA
TOTAL %
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.61904%
0.64416%
0.72824%

Appendix F

Means of Experimental and Control Groups

Means - Control Group
Mean
YEAR
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

EEOC

EPA

GSA

.0165706
.0150696
.0133874
.0110030
.0095672
.0127737
.0167800

.0039106
.0038760
.0037504
.0041648
.0035375
.0040007

.0088060
.0070652
.0053687
.0082991
.0064188

Total

.0135931

.0038733

.0071916

NARA

NASA

.0040282
.0032862
.0059642
.0043874
.0031857
.0041704

NRC

OPM

.0030533
.0020749
.0019696
.0026006
.0032501

.0028635
.0037221
.0030349
.0037228
.0029333
.0031863

.0093909
.0106922
.0052026
.0078409
.0180921
.0105737
.0068234
.0055411
.0032451

.0025897

.0032438

.0086002

SSA

Yearly
Average

.0092550
.0060625
.0075606
.0082833

.0061904
.0064416
.0072824

0.009391
0.010692
0.010887
0.005935
0.007464
0.006030
0.005933
0.005872
0.005107

.0077903

.0066381

0.006410

SBA

Means – Experimental Group
Mean
YEAR

FDICTOTALPER

GAOTOTALPER

SECTOTALPER

Yearly Average

2003

.0060573

.0027439

.0039926

.0042646

2004

.0068027

.0015361

.0065841

.0049743

2005

.0071848

.0015601

.0043512

.0043654

2006

.0083498

.0107362

.0036131

.0075664

2007

.0075464

.0046875

.0031447

.0051262

2008

.0026321

.0025397

.0030295

.0027338

Total

.0064289

.0039672

.0041192

.0048384
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Appendix G
Time Series Analysis and Best Fit of CG and EG
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Appendix H
Control Group - Time Series Analysis of Individual Agencies
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Appendix H Continued
Control Group - Time Series Analysis of Individual Agencies
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Appendix H Continued
Control Group - Time Series Analysis of Individual Agencies
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Appendix H Continued
Control Group - Time Series Analysis of Individual Agencies

43

Appendix H Continued
Control Group - Time Series Analysis of Individual Agencies
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Appendix I
Experimental Group - Time Series Analysis of Individual Agencies
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Appendix I Continued
Experimental Group - Time Series Analysis of Individual Agencies
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